A general model for MAC generation using direct injection by Bartlett, Harry et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Bartlett, Harry, ALMashrafi, Mufeed, Simpson, Leonie, Dawson, Edward,
& Wong, Kenneth Koon-Ho (2013) A general model for MAC generation
using direct injection. Lecture Notes in Computer Science [Information Se-
curity and Cryptology: 8th International Conference, Inscrypt 2012], 7763,
pp. 198-215.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/55534/
c© Copyright 2012 Please consult the authors.
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38519-3_13
A general model for MAC generation using
direct injection
Harry Bartlett1,2, Mufeed AlMashrafi1,2, Leonie Simpson1,2, Ed Dawson1,2 and
Kenneth Koon-Ho Wong1
1 Institute for Future Environments,
2 Science and Engineering Faculty,
Queensland University of Technology
GPO Box 2434, Brisbane Qld 4001, Australia
{h.bartlett,lr.simpson,e.dawson,kk.wong}@qut.edu.au
almashrafi@student.qut.edu.au
Abstract. This paper presents a model for generating a MAC tag by
injecting the input message directly into the internal state of a nonlinear
filter generator. This model generalises a similar model for unkeyed hash
functions proposed by Nakano et al. We develop a matrix representation
for the accumulation phase of our model and use it to analyse the se-
curity of the model against man-in-the-middle forgery attacks based on
collisions in the final register contents. The results of this analysis show
that some conclusions of Nakano et al regarding the security of their
model are incorrect. We also use our results to comment on several re-
cent MAC proposals which can be considered as instances of our model
and specify choices of options within the model which should prevent
the type of forgery discussed here. In particular, suitable initialisation
of the register and active use of a secure nonlinear filter will prevent an
attacker from finding a collision in the final register contents which could
result in a forged MAC.
Keywords: MAC, Hash functions, Stream ciphers, Forgery attacks, SSS,
SOBER128, NLSv2.
1 Introduction
In the context of cryptography, Message Authentication Codes (MACs) are used
to provide assurance of message integrity. MACs share some properties with hash
functions and are often calculated similarly.
In this paper, we extend a model proposed by Nakano et al [7] for unkeyed
hash functions to a model for MAC generation. We develop a matrix description
of this model and use this to provide a security analysis of our model against
man-in-the-middle forgery attacks based on MAC collisions.
The structure of our paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the properties
of MAC functions, describe our model for generating MACs using stream ciphers
and discuss how this model relates to Nakano et al ’s model for unkeyed hash
functions. In Section 3, we develop the matrix representation for this model, and
2in Section 4, we present a security analysis based on this matrix representation
– including a revision to Nakano et al ’s analysis of their model. In Section 5,
we briefly discuss current MAC proposals which are described by our model,
including the implications of our security analysis for these proposals, before
presenting a summary and conclusions from our work in Section 6.
2 Description of MAC Model
Message Authentication Codes (“MACs” or “MAC tags”) are widely used to
provide assurance of message integrity for either plaintext or ciphertext mes-
sages. These applications are referred to as authentication and authenticated
encryption respectively. In the context of authenticated encryption, a MAC tag
can be generated from either the plaintext or the ciphertext. To encompass both
of these possibilities, we use the term “message” to refer to whichever of the
plaintext and ciphertext is being used as the input to the MAC generation pro-
cess.
To be classified as secure, a MAC algorithm is required to satisfy the following
properties [6]:
1. ease of computation
2. compression to a fixed bit-length
3. computation resistance: given zero or more text-MAC pairs (xi,MAC(xi), it
is computationally infeasible to compute a text-MAC pair (x,MAC(x) for
any new input x 6= xi (including possibly for the case where MAC(x) =
MAC(xi) for some i).
For parties not knowing the secret key of the MAC, property 3 above implies
the classical hash function requirements of preimage resistance, second-preimage
resistance and collision resistance.
MAC generation is performed in three phases. In the first phase, the message
is prepared by padding with any value which is predefined in the specification of
the cipher. This process is performed either to avoid any insertion forgery attacks
or to match the length of the message with the size of each stage in the internal
state, or both. Also in this phase, the internal state of the integrity component of
the cipher is initialised using a keystream sequence which is generated using a se-
cret key and optional public IV. In the second phase, the message is accumulated
into the state of the integrity component using the accumulation function. The
accumulation function can update this state in either of two ways: the state can
be updated directly with the message contents or it can be updated indirectly
by using the message bits to control the accumulation of unknown keystream
bits into the state. After the whole message has been processed, the final phase
occurs: the contents of the LFSR are processed using a finalisation function to
form a MAC tag for the input message.
In another paper [1], we have presented and analysed a general model for
the full process of generating a MAC tag using indirect injection. In the current
paper, we consider the case where the input message is accumulated directly
3into the internal state of the stream cipher and propose a general model for the
second phase of MAC generation in this case. This model does not explicitly
include the other two MAC generation phases and is an extension of a hash
function model proposed by Nakano et al [7].
2.1 Our model
We consider the case of injecting a message directly into the state of the keystream
generator for a stream cipher. For simplicity, we use a nonlinear filter generator
which consists of one linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and a nonlinear filter
function, as the state is contained in a single register. We assume the compo-
nents of this nonlinear filter generator are selected for their security properties.
That is, the feedback polynomial of the LFSR is a primitive polynomial and
the filter function is nonlinear, balanced and with high correlation immunity.
This provides resistance to various types of attacks on stream ciphers. During
the message accumulation phase, the LFSR is updated according to its feed-
back function (denoted by yt) and we also allow the output of the nonlinear
filter (denoted by zt) to be accumulated into the internal state of the LFSR
simultaneously with the input message (denoted by mt), as shown in Figure 1.
Feedback function fb 
Non-Linear filter function f 
mt 
a[0] 
yt 
zt 
Register A 
zt 
yt 
a[1] a[2] a[3] a[d-3] a[d-2] a[d-1] 
Fig. 1. General model for MAC generation using the input message directly
In general, we assume that the LFSR is a word-based register, which we
denote as Register A. (Note: in terms of our model, a binary LSFR is a special
case of a word-based register in which the word length is 1 bit and the addition
operation is equivalent to binary XOR.) There are three possible inputs to each
stage in A: the first is either the feedback word yt for stage a[d−1] or the content
of stage a[i+ 1] for stage a[i] with 0 ≤ i ≤ d−2; the second and third inputs are
the input message word mt and the nonlinear filter output word zt. These three
inputs can be fed into the register stages in one of two ways: either by combining
4mt and/or zt with either yt or a[i+ 1] using the register’s addition operation, or
by replacing the content of the relevant stage with the chosen combination of mt
and zt. Our model incorporates both these alternatives, as discussed in Section
3 below.
2.2 How this generalise Nakano et al ’s model
Nakano et al [7] considered the situation of using a binary LFSR with an associ-
ated nonlinear filter to generate an unkeyed hash function for a given message,
a process they describe as injecting the message into the internal state of the
hash function. They then provided a security analysis for two configurations
of injecting the message and filter output directly into the LFSR, namely (1)
XORing them into the last stage of the register and (2) XORing them together
into several regularly spaced stages of the register. Since they are considering
unkeyed hash functions, they assume that the attacker knows the plaintext and
the corresponding hash value and look at ways of manipulating a message in
order to find collisions between the hash functions of distinct messages.
Our proposal generalises this model in two ways: both by generalising the
register from a binary register to a word-based register and by extending the con-
text from generating unkeyed hash functions to the formation of MACs for either
authentication only or authenticated encryption applications. This widened con-
text requires the use of a key and IV, as described above, whereas Nakano et
al use no key and assume that the LFSR is initialised with zeroes. They also
assume that the (plaintext) message is known, but we note that this will not
usually be the case in authenticated encryption applications.
The generalisation to word-based registers is a straightforward extension
which recognises the growing use of such registers in recent stream cipher pro-
posals. The word based LFSR can be more efficient in software especially when
the finite field that underlies the LFSR operations is suited to a processor. The
best choices for such a field are the Galois fields GF(2w), where w is the size of
item in the entire processor used by the application. All the elements and the
coefficients of the recurrence relation in this field will then utilise one unit of
storage in this processor.
3 Matrix Representation
As we are dealing in general with a word-based register, we note that the addi-
tion operation used in evaluating the register feedback may be either modular
addition or bitwise XOR, according to the cipher specification. In the following
derivation, the matrix operations used to describe the register update process in
our model are assumed to incorporate this same addition operation, which we
denote using ⊕. To maintain consistency between the numbering of the register
stages and matrix elements, we index the rows and columns of our matrices from
zero.
5We first note that the autonomous operation of the LFSR can be described
in terms of a matrix equation [5, 8] as follows. Referring to Figure 1 we suppose
the LFSR A has d stages, which we denote as a[0], a[1], . . . , a[d− 1] and that
the feedback function fb of A is described by the equation fb = c0a[0]⊕ c1a[1]⊕
· · · ⊕ cd−1a[d − 1]. If we represent the contents of register A at time t by the
vector At = (at[0] at[1] · · · at[d − 1])T then the contents of register A at time
t+ 1 can be represented by the equation At+1 = CAt where
C =

0 1 0 · · · · · · 0 0
0 0 1 · · · · · · 0 0
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
0 · · · · · · 0 0 1 0
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 0 1
c0 c1 . . . . . . . . . cd−2 cd−1

is the usual companion matrix of the register A.
We now extend this equation to incorporate the injection of the message and
the filter output into the register, by writing:
At+1 = CAt ⊕mtσm ⊕ ztσz (1)
where σm and σz are vectors of zeroes and ones indicating which stages of the
register the message word and the output filter word, respectively, are injected
into. More specifically,
σm,i =
{
0, mt is not injected into stage i,
1, mt is injected into stage i
and similarly
σz,i =
{
0, zt is not injected into stage i,
1, zt is injected into stage i.
If the injection method is replacement rather than combination (by addition)
with the updated register contents, then we adapt C by replacing the one in the
relevant row by a zero. Thus C takes the form:
C =

0 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
0 · · · · · · 0 0 0 · · · · · · 0
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
0 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0 0 1
c0 c1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · cd−2 cd−1

← (row i)
6where row i corresponds to the register stage whose contents are being replaced.
If the value of the input message and/or filter output replaces the contents of
more than one stage of register A, then all the rows corresponding to these stages
in matrix C are set to zero in the same manner as for stage i in the equation
above.
Note that our model actually allows for a mixture of the above alternatives as
well, that is, for the situation where mt and/or zt are injected into some stages
using addition and others using replacement. The non-zero entries in σm and
σz indicate which stages mt and zt respectively are injected into, while the zero
rows in C indicate the stages for which this injection is done by replacement.
(For all other indicated stages, the injection will be by combination (addition)
with the updated contents of that stage.)
Now let l be the length of the input message in words. We take Equation
1 and iterate it l times to obtain the corresponding equation for the complete
accumulation phase. For simplicity, we assume initially that the filter output is
not injected into the LFSR, that is, that σz is an all-zero vector. Successively
iterating Equation 1 gives us
A1 = CA0 ⊕ σmm0
A2 = C(CA0 ⊕ σmm0)⊕ σmm1 = C2A0 ⊕ Cσmm0 ⊕ σmm1
...
Al = C
lA0 ⊕ Cl−1σmm0 ⊕ Cl−2σmm1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Cσmml−2 ⊕ σmml−1
= ClA0 ⊕KmMl−1
whereKm = (C
l−1σm Cl−2σm · · · Cσm σm) andMl−1 = (m0 m1 · · · ml−2 ml−1)T .
Returning to the general case, where σz is non-zero, a similar analysis yields
the final equation for the register contents Al at the end of the accumulation
phase
Al = C
lA0 ⊕KmMl−1 ⊕KzZl−1 (2)
where Kz = (C
l−1σz Cl−2σz · · · Cσz σz), Zl−1 = (z0 z1 · · · zl−2 zl−1)T and
Km and Ml−1 are as defined above.
4 Security Analysis
Under the direct injection model for MAC generation, the message accumulation
phase plays a critical role in the security of the MAC generation process. Any
collision which occurs in this phase for any two distinct messages using the same
keystream sequence will result in the same MAC tag being generated for both
messages regardless of the process performed in the other two phases of MAC
generation (preparation and finalisation). In this section, we therefore analyse the
security of the message accumulation process for direct message injection with
respect to forgery attacks based on collisions. More particularly, we consider a
man-in-the-middle style forgery attack, as follows.
Suppose that for a message M , a MAC tag MACK,IV (M) is generated using
key K and a known IV . The sender intends to transmit the message-MAC tag
7pair to a particular receiver. Assume a man-in-the-middle attacker intercepts the
message-MAC tag pair, and tries to modify M and possibly also MACK,IV (M)
to calculate a valid MAC tag MACK,IV (M
′) for a modified message M ′. The
attacker then sends the new pair (M ′,MACK,IV (M ′)) to the intended recipient.
If it is possible to alter M to M ′ and provide a valid MACK,IV (M ′) without
any knowledge of the keystream sequences used to generate MACK,IV (M), the
forgery attack is then successful.
In the following section, we analyse the general case for collisions in our
model, using the matrix formulation derived above. In doing so, we consider
for completeness the case where the message and the initial contents of the
register are known. We note, however, that a MAC cannot be secure under these
conditions, since any attacker can replicate the initial state of the register and
obtain the corresponding final state for any message by simply accumulating
that message in the normal way. In the context of authenticated encryption, this
includes the case where the accumulated message is the ciphertext, but not the
case where the accumulated message is the plaintext (which should be unknown
to the attacker). Following this analysis, we apply our results to give a revised
analysis of Nakano et al ’s model for hash functions.
4.1 Analysis of collisions in the general model
Recall from Section 2.1 that we allow two methods for inserting the message and
nonlinear filter output words into the LFSR of our model, namely combination
(by addition) with the updated register contents or replacement of those con-
tents. We consider first the situations where the inserted words are combined
with the updated contents. It is also convenient to divide the analysis into cases
according to whether the nonlinear filter is used in the accumulation process.
(1) Insertion using addition
Case 1: If nonlinear filter is not used
In this case Equation 2 reduces to At = C
tA0 ⊕KmMt−1. Since the nonlinear
filter output is not used, all the operations in the accumulation process are linear.
Provided the message is longer than d words, it is then possible to manipulate
the message to force a collision for two distinct messages without knowing the
contents of the original message or the initial contents of the register. This
capability follows directly from the matrix formulation of Km according to the
following theorem:
Theorem 1 Assume that σm 6= 0 and consider the set U = {ui = Ciσm|i ≥ 0}.
(a) If C is a companion matrix of full rank (that is, if c0 6= 0), then there is
a positive number n ≤ d such that any n consecutive columns Ci+n−1σm, . . . ,
Ci+1σm, C
iσm in Km form a basis for span{U}.
(b) If C is the companion matrix for a LFSR with a primitive feedback polynomial
of degree d, then any d consecutive columns in Km form a basis for span{U}.
8Proof. We first show that σm, Cσm, . . . , C
n−1σm form a basis for span{U}.
Since C is non-singular, it follows that this also applies to Ciσm, C
i+1σm, . . . ,
Ci+n−1σm for any i ≥ 0.
Let n be the largest integer for which the vectors σm, Cσm, . . . , C
n−1σm are
linearly independent. (Since σm 6= 0, n > 0.) Then we must have Cnσm =
a0σm ⊕ a1Cσm ⊕ . . . ⊕ an−1Cn−1σm for some a0, a1, . . . , an−1. But then
Cn+1σm = a0Cσm⊕ a1C2σm⊕ . . . ⊕ an−2Cn−1σm⊕ an−1Cnσm can obviously
be expressed in this form as well and it follows by induction that the same is
true for Cjσm for any j ≥ n. Thus σm, Cσm, . . . , Cn−1σm form a basis for
span{U}.
Now consider |U | and recall that each stage of a word-based register contains a
word of size w bits. If the LFSR has a primitive feedback polynomial of degree
d, then U must cycle through all 2wd−1 non-zero vectors in {0, 1, . . . , 2w−1}d,
which implies that any basis for span{U} in this case must contain d vectors.
But this case gives the maximum possible value for |U |, so for a general LFSR
we must have n ≤ d. uunionsq
Based on this theorem, we may write, for example, Cl−1σm = a1Cl−2σm +
. . . + adC
l−d−1σm with a1, a2, . . . , ad not all zero. If we now consider the
process of multiplying these columns of Km by the first d+ 1 words of Ml−1 (as
part of the MAC accumulation process), we see that any non-zero change in m0
can be cancelled out by making suitable changes in the words m1 to md. Hence
a collision will occur and as a result of that an attacker can send a forged MAC
tag utilising this type of collision attack. In fact, by a similar argument, it is
clear that up to l − d words of the message can be manipulated at will in this
way, with the resulting changes in Al being cancelled out by suitable changes in
the remaining d words of the message.
Note that the above result applies whether the initialisation of register A is
known or unknown, since all the operations are linear.
If the model under this assumption is used for authentication only, then the
message is the plaintext which is known to the attacker. It follows that the
attacker will also know the plaintext of the forged message. (In fact, as noted
above, he has freedom to choose up to l − d words of this forged message.) If
the model is used for authenticated encryption, the plaintext will not normally
be known, but an attacker can still forge a MAC tag by manipulating the ci-
phertext. (If the input message to the MAC accumulation process is ciphertext,
the above analysis applies directly; if the input message is plaintext, the result
follows provided that the plaintext has been encrypted using a binary additive
stream cipher with a keystream that is independent of the message and the MAC
generation process.)
Case 2: If nonlinear filter is used
As noted previously, the following analysis assumes that the nonlinear filter used
in the accumulation process is secure from attack. If we include this nonlinear
filter in the accumulation process for the input message, then there are three
further cases for message and filter output injection into the internal states.
Case 2a: Message and initial state known, σm = σz. Then Km = Kz and
9we can still manipulate the input message. Since we are accumulating (mt ⊕ zt)
and zt can be determined at each step, we see that mt can be adjusted as re-
quired to achieve the same result as before and hence force the collision to occur.
Case 2b: Message and initial state known, σm 6= σz. Then Km 6= Kz and
so it may not be possible to adjust for the effects of zt. In principle any change
in zt at a single time point can be counteracted by a suitable combination of
manipulated message words mt+1, . . . , mt+d, but these changes may then result
in changes to later bits of Z, and there is no guarantee that all of these can be
adjusted for. It may be possible to manipulate the register contents to obtain a
collision for some special cases of message and initial register contents, but these
cases would be extremely rare. Note, however (as remarked previously) that this
case is nonetheless insecure because message and initialisation are both known.
Case 2c: Either message or initial state unknown. In this case, the un-
known initialisation and the assumed security of the nonlinear filter function
guarantee that zt cannot be determined with better than brute force probabil-
ity, so (even where σm = σz) it is not possible to determine how to manipulate
mt to get the desired result. Thus, the accumulation process will be secure in
this case. This result underscores the need in authentication applications for the
register to be initialised with key-dependent (unknown) values.
(2) Insertion with replacement
As before, we consider two cases according to whether the filter output is used.
Case 1: If nonlinear filter is not used
If the filter output is not used, we can apply a similar analysis to the one given
above, to show that a collision can be forced during the accumulation process.
The first part of the previous proof still applies, to show that σm, Cσm, . . . ,
Cn−1σm form a basis for span{U}, so a forgery can still be obtained for any
message of length l > d. However, the matrix C no longer has full rank, so the
result cannot be extended to any n consecutive columns of Km.
In practice, this is not a serious restriction, since the columns σm, Cσm, . . . ,
Cn−1σm in Km are those which multiply the final n words ml − n, . . . , ml − 1
of the message. Thus, the first l − n words of the message can be modified at
will in the forgery and the resulting changes in Al can then be cancelled out by
suitable changes in the remaining n words of the message.
In fact, by considering the form of Km for this insertion alternative a little
more closely, we can see that if the message words are inserted into stage i of the
register, then only n− i−1 of the final n words need to be used for this purpose.
(More specifically, these are the words ml−n, . . . , ml−i−2, and the final i + 1
words are not used.)
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To demonstrate this claim, consider the vector Cσm, calculated as follows
0 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
0 · · · · · · 0 0 0 · · · · · · 0
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
0 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0 0 1
c0 c1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · cd−2 cd−1


σm,0
σm,1
...
σm,d−2
σm,d−1
 =

σm,1
σm,2
...
σm,i
0
σm,i+2
...
σm,d−1
cTσm

where the zero occurs in row i of Cσm and we have used c
T to denote the final
row of matrix C and cTσm to denote its product with the column vector σm.
Successive multiplications by C will continue to move the elements of the vector
(including any zeroes) further up the column, inserting a new element in the
final position and also inserting an extra zero at row i at each iteration. Thus
the final form of Km will be:
Km =

0 · · · 0 σm,i · · · · · · σm,1 σm,0
...
. . . 0 0
. . .
. . . σm,2 σm,1
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . σm,i σm,i−1
0 · · · 0 0 · · · · · · 0 σm,i
cTCl−d+i+1σm · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · σm,i+2 σm,i+1
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
cTCl−3σm · · · · · · · · · · · · cTσm σm,d−1 σm,d−2
cTCl−2σm · · · · · · · · · · · · cTCσm cTσm σm,d−1

It is clear from this result that the final contents of stages a[0] to a[i] of the
LFSR are affected only by the final i+1 words (ml−i−1 to ml−1) of the message.
Since a change made to any earlier word cannot affect the final content of these
stages, these words are not needed to adjust for any such changes. It is also clear
that the remaining stages can all be manipulated by using only the words ml−n,
. . . , ml−i−2 (which are multiplied by the remaining n− i−1 vectors in the basis
for U).
Note: If the message is inserted by replacement into k > 1 stages, say i1
< i2 < · · · < ik, then a similar argument shows that the final i∗ + 1 words
are not used, where i∗ = max(i1, ij−ij−1−1 for j > 1) and we only need to
use the n − ik − 1 message words ml−n−i∗+ik , . . . , ml−i∗−2 to cancel out the
changes introduced by any earlier words. Since the index l−n−i∗+ik > l−n, this
11
actually increases the number of words that can be freely modified in the forgery.
Case 2: If nonlinear filter is used
If the filter output is used, then the arguments from Case 2 of alternative (1)
apply as given previously and lead to a similar conclusion. That is, collisions can
again be forced if both the input message and initialisation are known and the
input message and the filter output are injected into the same stages, but not if
either the input message or initialisation is unknown.
A summary of the conclusions from these analyses is presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of the analysis for MAC generation using direct message injection.
Cases
Nonlinear Message/Register Other Forced Overall
filter initialisation condition collisions? Outcome
1 not used any — Yes not secure (collisions)
2a used both known σm = σz Yes not secure (collisions)
2b used both known σm 6= σz Unlikely not secure – other
2c used either unknown — No secure
4.2 Applying our results to Nakano et al ’s model
As mentioned previously, Nakano et al [7] analysed two configurations for inject-
ing the message and filter output directly into the binary register of a nonlinear
filter generator to generate a hash value, namely (1) XORing them into the last
stage of the register and (2) XORing them together into several regularly spaced
stages of the register. For the first configuration, they concluded that the full
register can be manipulated using the input message and hence that it is easy to
force a collision. For the second configuration, they injected the message into r
stages at intervals of d/r and claimed that the probability of obtaining a collision
in this case will be 2−d(1−1/r)/2.
Since both configurations are described by Case 2a in Table 1, we conclude
that an attacker can easily obtain a collision in both cases. Thus our analysis
confirms their conclusion for the first configuration but contradicts their conclu-
sion for the second configuration. As long as the filter output is injected into the
same stages as the message (and provided the register initialisation is known),
it is always possible to use the message bit mt to adjust for the known value of
the filter output bit zt as well as for the changes made to earlier message bits.
The only constraint in obtaining a collision using this process is that the length
of the input message must be greater than d bits.
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5 Current Proposals Described by Our Model
In this section, we examine three stream ciphers with authentication mechanisms
which can be considered as instances of the general model presented in Section
2.1. All three ciphers are word based, with word sizes of either 16 or 32 bits.
These algorithms are SSS [3], NLSv2 [4] and SOBER-128 [2]. In this section,
we do not consider the provision of confidentiality but investigate the integrity
assurance component only. In particular, the following subsections describe the
accumulation process for the input message for each cipher; we also provide
comments on the security of this process in each case, based on our analysis
above.
5.1 SSS
The SSS stream cipher [3] uses a word size of 16 bits, so operations are performed
over GF(216). The accumulation register A has 17 stages and uses the feedback
function fb = a[15] ⊕ a[4] ⊕ δa[0], where δ is a non-trivial element of GF(216)
chosen by the cipher designers and ⊕ is the bitwise XOR operation. This cipher
does not use a nonlinear filter and the input message word is accumulated directly
into the final stage a[16] of the register by combining it (using bitwise XOR) with
the feedback word, as shown in Figure 2. Note also that the input message is
the plaintext message, which is unknown to an attacker, and that the register is
initialised using keystream.
Register A a[4] … … … a[15] a[16] a[0] 
δ 
mt 
Fig. 2. Message accumulation mechanism in SSS
For these specifications, σz = 0 in our model, σm = ( 0 0 · · · 0 1 )T and the
final row of the companion matrix is cT = ( δ 0 0 0 1 0 · · · 0 1 0 ); further the
matrix Km can be constructed as:
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Km =

· · · 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
· · · 1 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0
· · · 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · 0
· · · 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · · 0
· · · 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · 0
· · · 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
· · · 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · 0
· · · 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · · · 0
· · · 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · · 0
· · · 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · 0
· · · 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · 0
· · · 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 · · · 0
· · · 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 · · 0
· · · 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 · 0
· · · 1 + δ 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
· · · 1 1 + δ 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
· · · 2 + 2δ 1 1 + δ 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1

Based on the description above, SSS is considered to be Case 1 in Table
1; as discussed in Section 4.1, the MAC accumulation process in this cipher is
therefore not secure against forgery attacks based on collisions.
However, for SSS the input message words are also used to generate keystream
words by a self synchronous process. This process is beyond the scope of our
analysis, which focuses on the MAC accumulation process only. Because the
keystream is generated using a self synchronous mechanism, manipulating the
input message words results in different output keystream words and so the re-
sulting ciphertext will be changed unpredictably. So the fact that SSS uses a self
synchronous stream cipher instead of using a nonlinear filter in the accumulation
process will prevent this type of collisions. Even if the register A of the accu-
mulation process uses a known initialisation such as zero values, this additional
mechanism prevents the attacker from generating a MAC that corresponds with
the received message.
5.2 NLSv2
NLSv2 [4] uses a word size of 32 bits, so operations are performed over GF(232).
The accumulation register A has eight stages and uses the feedback function
fb = a[5] ⊕ δa[0], where δ is here a non-trivial element of GF(232) chosen by
the cipher designers and ⊕ is again the bitwise XOR operation. This cipher also
does not use a nonlinear filter and the input message word is again accumulated
directly into the final stage (here a[8]) of the register by combining it with the
feedback word, as shown in Figure 3. Note that the input message is again
the plaintext message, which is unknown to an attacker, and that register A is
initialised with keystream.
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Register A a[5] … a[6] a[7] a[0] 
δ 
mt 
… 
Fig. 3. Message accumulation mechanism in NLSv2
For these specifications, we again have σz = 0 and σm = ( 0 0 · · · 0 1 )T , but
here the final row of the companion matrix is cT = ( δ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 ) and the
matrix Km is:
Km =

· · · δ 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
· · · 1 δ 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
· · · 0 1 δ 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
· · · 2δ 0 1 δ 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
· · · 1 2δ 0 1 δ 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
· · · 0 1 2δ 0 1 δ 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
· · · 3δ 0 1 2δ 0 1 δ 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
· · · 1 3δ 0 1 2δ 0 1 δ 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1

Based on the description above, NLSv2 is also considered to be Case 1 in
Table 1, and again the MAC accumulation process in this cipher is therefore not
secure against forgery attacks based on collisions.
However, the input message word in NLSv2 is also accumulated at the same
time into a different register. This accumulation process is not linear as a non-
linear function is used when the input message is accumulated into this other
register. In this case, manipulating the input message words will affect the non-
linear register in an unpredictable manner. Introducing any differences in the
input message word to force a collision in the linear register will result in dif-
ferent contents in the nonlinear register. So when the attacker tries to modify
another message word to cancel the difference that was introduced in the linear
register by the previously modified message word, this word will also introduce
another different word in the second register and so the attacker cannot con-
trol that collision in this way. So the fact that NLSv2 uses both a linear and a
nonlinear register for message accumulation prevents simultaneous collisions in
the two registers. Even if the initialisation of A is known, the attacker cannot
manipulate the input message to obtain collisions in both registers at the same
time.
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5.3 SOBER-128
SOBER-128 [2] has a word size of 32 bits, so operations are performed over
GF(232). The register A has 17 stages, with a feedback function of fb = a[15]⊕
a[4]⊕δa[0] where δ is again a non-trivial element of GF(232) chosen by the cipher
designers and ⊕ is the bitwise XOR operation. In this cipher, a nonlinear filter
is used, and the output from this filter is inserted into the register by using it
to replace the previous contents of stage a[4], as shown in Figure 4. The input
message is accumulated into the register via the nonlinear filter as follows: the
input message word is combined with the previous contents of stage a[4] by
addition modulo 232, and the output of this operation then forms an input word
to the nonlinear filter. Note also that the input message is again the plaintext
message, which is unknown to an attacker, and that register A is again initialised
with keystream.
Register A a[4] … … … a[15] a[16] a[0] 
δ 
mt 
Non-Linear Filter 
Fig. 4. Message accumulation mechanism in SOBER-128
For SOBER-128, the filter output zt depends directly on the message word mt
and mt is not injected separately into the register, so σm is effectively all zeroes.
As noted above, the filter output zt replaces the old contents of stage a[4], so
σz in this case will be given by ( 0 0 0 0 1 0 · · · 0 0 )T . If we denote the nonlinear
filter function in Figure 4 as f , then we have zt = f(mt + at[4]) where + is an
addition modulo 232. For these specifications, C is modified companion matrix
with a final row of cT = ( δ 0 0 0 1 0 · · · 0 1 0 ) and row of zeroes corresponding
to stage a[4] of the register, namely
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C =

0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · 0
0 0 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · · 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 · · · · 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · 0
0 · · · · · 0 1 0 · · · · · · · 0
0 · · · · · · 0 1 0 · · · · · · 0
0 · · · · · · · 0 1 0 · · · · · 0
0 · · · · · · · · 0 1 0 · · · · 0
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0
0 · · · · · · · · · · 0 1 0 · · 0
0 · · · · · · · · · · · 0 1 0 · 0
0 · · · · · · · · · · · · 0 1 0 0
0 · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
δ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

It is also interesting to construct the matrix Kz in this case; we have:
Kσ =

· · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
· · · 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0 1 0 0 0
· · · 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0 0 1 0 0
· · · 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · 0 0 0 1 0
· · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
· · · δ+ 0 δ+ 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · 0
· · · 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
· · · δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · · · · 0
· · · 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · · · 0
· · · δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · · 0
· · · 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · · 0
· · · δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 1 0 1 0 · · · · 0
· · · 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 1 0 1 0 · · · 0
· · · δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 1 0 1 0 · · 0
· · · 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 1 0 1 0 · 0
· · · δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 1 0 1 0 0
· · · 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 δ+ 0 1 0 1 0

where we have used δ+ to denote 1+δ for brevity. In this case, the columns C16σz
and C15σz can be seen to provide a basis for all “previous” columns (C
16+jσz
for j > 0). If this were a Km matrix and the initialisation was known, then only
the words ml−16 and ml−17 would need to be modified in order to compensate
for any changes in the previous words of the message.
Returning to the specifics of this cipher, we note from the description above
that the accumulation process of the input message words involves using a non-
linear filter in the accumulation register, that the register A is initialised with
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keystream words and that the input message words that are accumulated into
the register are the plaintext words, which are assumed to be unknown to the
attacker. Based on these features, SOBER-128 is considered to be case 2c in
Table 1; as discussed in Section 4.1 above, the MAC accumulation process for
this cipher should therefore be secure against forgery attacks based on collision
in this case.
We note that there is nonetheless a reported forgery attack on SOBER-128
[9] which uses the same method of introducing differences in the input message
words and cancelling out this difference after a certain number of clocks. We also
note, however, that this attack is not due to the weakness of the accumulation
process itself but rather to the weakness of the nonlinear filter that is used in
the accumulation process. We assumed in setting up our model that a secure
nonlinear filter is used in the filter generator, and it is clear from this example
that the security of the accumulation process for this direct injection model relies
(among other things) on the strength of this nonlinear filter.
6 Summary and Conclusions
This paper considers the process of generating MAC tags by injecting the input
message and optionally the nonlinear filter output directly into the internal state
of a nonlinear filter keystream generator comprising a LFSR and a nonlinear filter
function. It describes a general model for the accumulation phase of this process
and provides a security analysis of this model. The model we describe extends a
model of Nakano et al for generating unkeyed hash values, generalising it to the
case of word-based registers and extending the context from generating unkeyed
hash functions to generating MACs (requiring the use of a key and IV). In this
model, the message being accumulated could be either plaintext or ciphertext
and the plaintext will not necessarily be known to the attacker.
In our model, we consider two alternative methods for injecting the message
and the filter output into the internal state (LFSR) of the generator. The first
method is to combine the input message and/or the filter output with the up-
dated content of the relevant stages using the register’s addition operation (XOR
for binary registers). The second method is to replace the previous content of
the relevant stages with the new combination of the input message and the filter
output. The model also allows the possibility that the first alternative might be
used in some stages of the register and the second alternative in other stages;
the security analysis for this situation would be similar to those reported here
for the two separate alternatives.
Having described our model, we develop a matrix representation for the accu-
mulation phase of MAC generation. Using this matrix representation, we provide
a security analysis of the general model and describe conditions under which a
collision can be forced which would enable a man-in-the-middle forgery to be
successful. Specifically we show that suitable initialisation of the register and
active use of the nonlinear filter prevent an attacker from finding a collision in
the final register contents which would result in a forged MAC.
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We use the results of this analysis to revisit Nakano et al ’s analysis of their
model. In particular, our analysis enables us to show, contrary to their con-
clusions, that collisions can always be forced in the entire register under their
second configuration (injecting the message and filter output together into mul-
tiple stages of the register). We also applied the results of our security analysis to
three existing authentication proposals which use direct injection in the accumu-
lation phase of MAC generation. We found in two cases (SSS and NLSv2) that
the accumulation mechanism used is not secure by itself. However in both cases,
additional features of the authentication mechanism were used to overcome this
weakness. For example, use of a self synchronous construction prevents an at-
tacker from forging a valid MAC in the SSS stream cipher. In the third case
(SOBER-128) the accumulation mechanism should be secure, except for the
weakness of the nonlinear filter that was used.
Based on our analyses, we recommend the following procedures to prevent
collision attacks when using this model in the accumulation phase of MAC gen-
eration:
– Use a secure nonlinear filter in the accumulation process and ensure that its
output is injected into at least one stage of the register.
– Initialise the internal state of the LFSR with key-dependent secret values.
– When injecting the message and filter output into any stage of the LFSR,
combine them with the updated contents of the stage using the register’s
addition operation rather than replacing the updated contents.
– For added security, inject the message and the filter output into different
sets of LFSR stages.
The concept of generating MAC tags by injecting the message directly into
the internal state of a cipher’s integrity component can obviously be applied
to other structures apart from the nonlinear filter generator considered in this
paper. We considered this simple structure in order to demonstrate our approach
for developing and analysing models of the MAC generation process in this case.
Although it would be more complex, the same approach can be used to construct
a similar model for other such structures.
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